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SUMMARY
African swine fever virus (ASFV) continues to cause outbreaks in domestic pigs and wild boar in
Eastern European countries. To gain insights into its transmission dynamics, we estimated the
pig-to-pig basic reproduction number (R0) for the Georgia 2007/1 ASFV strain using a stochastic
susceptible-exposed-infectious-recovered (SEIR) model with parameters estimated from
transmission experiments. Models showed that R0 is 2·8 [95% confidence interval (CI) 1·3–4·8]
within a pen and 1·4 (95% CI 0·6–2·4) between pens. The results furthermore suggest that ASFV
genome detection in oronasal samples is an effective diagnostic tool for early detection of
infection. This study provides quantitative information on transmission parameters for ASFV in
domestic pigs, which are required to more effectively assess the potential impact of strategies for
the control of between-farm epidemic spread in European countries.
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INTRODUCTION
African swine fever virus (ASFV), a member of the
Asfarviridae family, causing a severe haemorrhagic
disease in domestic and wild swine is currently circulat-
ing in Eastern Europe [1, 2]. Controlling the spread
remains challenging due to the lack of effective vaccines
and treatments, the potentially long survival of the virus
in the environment and the potential role of wild boar in
virus spread [1]. African swine fever (ASF) also repre-
sents a serious concern for European pig-producing
countries due to the cost of stamping-out policies and
the economic burden that bans impose on international
trade, especially as production and consumption of
pork are expected to further increase in future [1, 3].
ASFV spreads by direct contact between infectious
and susceptible animals [4–10]. Infection may also
occur by indirect contact with, for example, contami-
nated surfaces of transport vehicles, contaminated
clothing of animal workers or through feeding of swill
that contains contaminated pig products [11–13].
Airborne transmission has been demonstrated over
short distances [14]. For each of the potential routes
for ASFV transmission between individual pigs, quan-
titative parameters have to be determined so that con-
trol programmes can be targeted based on the relative
importance of each pathway.
The basic reproduction number (R0), defined as the
average number of newly infected cases caused by one
infectious individual during its infectious period in a
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susceptible population, is a key quantitative indicator
of the transmission potential and therefore very useful
for evaluating the likely impact of different components
in control strategies [15–18]. So far, R0 for the currently
circulating ASFV strain in Eastern Europe has been
reported in only one study [19]. The authors developed
a mathematical model to describe the transmission of
ASFV within farms of the Russian Federation and esti-
mated R0 at 9·8 [95% confidence interval (CI) 3·9–15·6]
based on field and experimental data. However, esti-
mates for transmission parameters strongly depend on
assumptions regarding the length of the infectious,
latent and incubation periods [20–23]. For example,
different R0 estimates for classical swine fever virus
(CSFV) were obtained depending on the diagnostic
tool (detection of genome or infectious virus) or the
biological marker (viraemia, infectious oropharyngeal
or rectal fluids, clinical symptoms) used to determine
the time of infection or the duration of infectiousness
[24, 25].
The objective of the current study was to estimate
quantitative pig-to-pig transmission parameters for the
currently circulating ASFV strain in Eastern Europe.
For this purpose, we fitted stochastic Susceptible-
Exposed-Infectious-Removed (SEIR) models to de-
tailed data available from transmission experiments, in
which susceptible pigs were exposed by direct and in-
direct contact to pigs infected with the ASFV Georgia
2007/1 strain. Furthermore, we assessed the sensitivity
of the estimates to assumptions about the time of infec-
tion and duration of infectiousness for the infected
animals.
Ethical standards
The authors assert that all procedures contributing to
this work comply with the ethical standards of the
relevant national and institutional guides on the care
and use of laboratory animals. All experimental pro-
cedures, carried out under UK Home Office Licence
number 70/7198, were approved by the Pirbright
Ethical Review process. All animals were euthanized
for animal welfare reasons.
METHODS
Experimental ASFV dataset
Data were obtained from experimental ASFV trans-
mission in weaner pigs as described in Guinat et al.
[26]. In short, four groups of pigs were allocated to dif-
ferent rooms (A, B, C, D) and randomly selected pigs
were inoculated intramuscularly with the highly viru-
lent Georgia 2007/1 ASFV strain (Table 1). The inocu-
lated pigs were in direct contact with susceptible pigs
within each pen in all rooms. Rooms B and C were
each split into two adjacent pens allowing indirect con-
tact between inoculated and susceptible pigs, most like-
ly through airborne transmission and small amounts of
urine and faeces passing under the fence. The partition
between pens did not allow nose-to-nose contacts.
Blood samples were collected every 2 days and oral
and nasal fluid samples daily. Samples were tested
for presence of live ASFV and ASFV genome by
virus isolation and quantitative real-time polymerase
chain reaction (qPCR), respectively. All inoculated
animals became infected and contact transmission
was observed in all experimental groups. The inocu-
lated pigs were generally viraemic 1–3 days before
starting to excrete ASFV genome through the nasal
and oral routes. The within-pen and between-pen con-
tact pigs generally started to excrete ASFV genome
through nasal and oral fluid samples 1–4 days before
showing viraemia. Table 2 summarizes the diagnostic
results in blood samples during the study period for
all rooms.
Model assumptions
Three models were developed in this study, each as-
suming a different latent period (summarized in
Table 3). In all models, the animals were assumed to
be infectious as soon as ASFV was isolated from
blood samples, supported by the fact that ASFV
was mainly shed in blood [26]. Since data on the
moment of infection for the contact pigs were lacking,
they were considered infected before the onset of infec-
tiousness using an assumed latent period (L, the time
from infection to the onset of infectiousness [21]) of
either 3 days (model 1), 4 days (model 2) or 5 days
(model 3). This was based on values observed
among the inoculated pigs (Table 2).
Table 1. Numbers of pigs used and transmission results
with the Georgia 2007/1 African swine fever virus strain
Room
A B C D
Number of inoculated pigs 5 4 4 3
Number of within-pen contact pigs 5 4 4 3
Number of between-pen contact pigs 0 4 4 0
Number of newly infected pigs 5 8 8 3
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The infectious period (T) represents the time be-
tween the onset of infectiousness and death or recov-
ery [21]. The transmission experiments did not allow
T to be estimated because animals were euthanized
for welfare reasons, resulting in censored values
[± standard deviation (S.D.)] for T (e.g. average of
Table 2. Results of African swine fever virus (ASFV) isolation in blood samples from transmission experiments with
domestic pigs infected with the Georgia 2007/1 ASFV strain
Animals
Day post-inoculation
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Room A
WP contact − − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − − − +*
WP contact − − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − − + +*
Inoculated − − + + +*
Inoculated − + + + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
Inoculated − − + + +*
Room B
BP contact − − − − − + +*
BP contact − − − − − − + +*
BP contact − − − − − + + +*
BP contact − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
Inoculated − − + + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
Inoculated − − + +*
Room C
BP contact − − − − − − − − − +*
BP contact − − − − − − − − + +*
BP contact − − − − − − + + +*
BP contact − − − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − + + +*
WP contact − − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − − − + +*
Inoculated − + + + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
Inoculated − − + + + + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
Room D
WP contact − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − − + +*
WP contact − − − − − + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
Inoculated − + + +*
WP, Within-pen contact pigs; BP, between-pen contact pigs; –, negative virus isolation in blood; +, positive virus isolation in
blood.
* Day of euthanasia.
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4·7 (±1·4), 2·4 (±0·7) and 3·0 (±1·2) days observed
for the inoculated, within-pen and between-pen con-
tact pigs, respectively [26]). Therefore, animals were
considered infectious either for a time period of
3–6 days (minimum infectious period) usually
reported in previous studies or for 3–14 days (max-
imum infectious period) which has occasionally
been observed [27–29]. We assumed T was normally
distributed, as is considered to be a biologically real-
istic distribution for the infectious period of a virus
[30], either with a mean (±S.D.) of 4·5 (±0·75) days
or 8·5 (±2·75) days.
The animals were assumed to mix randomly either
within or between pens, i.e. to have equal opportunity
for contact with each other [21], which was considered
plausible given the limited room/pen size in the experi-
ments [26]. The number of new infections per unit of
time was assumed to be proportional to the product
of the proportion (or frequency) of infectious animals
and the number of susceptible animals [21] which was
considered adequate to describe the transmission
dynamics process [31, 32].
Model analyses
We considered a standard transmission scenario with
IA,t and IB,t, the number of infectious pigs, NA,t and
NB,t the total population size, in two pens A and B
at time t, respectively. Pen A housed the inoculated
pigs and the within-pen contact pigs, while pen B
housed the between-pen contact pigs. We used a sto-
chastic SEIR model to estimate the within- and
between-pen transmission rate parameters (βw and
βb). In the model (Fig. 1), the population was divided
into four classes over time t [21]: pigs leaving the sus-
ceptible compartment (St) became infected (EA,t and
EB,t) with probability of infection pt, those leaving
the infected compartment became infectious (IA,t
and IB,t) after L days, and those leaving the infectious
compartment died (Rt) after T days. The probability
pt depends on the number of infectious pigs (IA,t and
IB,t), the total population size (NA,t and NB,t) and
how frequently they make effective contact with
each other within and between pens (βw and βb),
so that
pt = 1− exp − βwIB,tNB,t +
βbIA,t
NA,t +NB,t
( )
( )( )
[33]. (1)
The number of new infections at time t (Ct) follows
a binomial distribution with the number of trials given
by the susceptible population (St) and the probability
of success given by the probability of infection (pt).
This was used to construct the likelihood for the
data and we estimated βw and βb by maximizing this
likelihood [34, 35]. In addition, 95% CIs were deter-
mined using ±1·96 times the standard error (S.E.)
with the S.E. obtained from the inverse of the negative
Hessian matrix for the log likelihood. Basic reproduc-
tion numbers (R0w and R0b) were calculated using
the relationship R0w = βwT and R0b = βbT [21] and
the 95% CIs were based on the variance of βw, βb
and T. Models were implemented using R statistical
software [35]. Models were compared based on
Akaike’s Information Criterion (AIC) [36].
Vaccination coverage
Using the transmission parameter estimates, we calcu-
lated the vaccination coverage required to prevent
pig-to-pig disease transmission based on the herd im-
munity threshold (HIT). HIT represents the minimum
proportion of pigs that need to be immune in the
population to limit ASFV transmission, given by
HIT = 1 – (1/R0w) [21].
Table 3. Model inputs
Model inputs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
βw, within-pen transmission rate Baseline value = 0·50 per day
βb, between-pen transmission rate Baseline value = 0·01 per day
L, latent period duration* 3 days 4 days 5 days
Marker for inoculated pigs Blood
Marker for within-pen contact pigs
Marker between-pen contact pigs
T, infectious period duration 3–6 days
3–14 days
* A 2-day latent period had also been considered (data not shown).
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Sensitivity analysis
We simulated ASF outbreaks in a pig unit to assess
the effects of different assumptions regarding the dif-
ferent latent and infectious period durations. The
weaner pigs on this farm unit are assumed to be
housed in a ring of six adjacent pens, with 90 pigs in
each (i.e. a total of 540 pigs). We simulated 1000 inde-
pendent outbreaks, initiated by the introduction of
one infected pig at time t= 0. For each simulation,
βw, βb and T were sampled from zero-truncated nor-
mal distributions under the assumption that these
parameters are independently distributed. The mean
and standard deviation for each distribution was
defined so that 95% of the sampled values would fall
within their respective 95% CI and L was considered
to be either 3, 4 or 5 days. The likelihood surface
for βw and βb suggested that the estimates for these
parameters were not correlated (data not shown).
We extended equation (1) to account for the fact
that each pen is adjacent to two others, rather than
one. Therefore, the probability that a susceptible pig
in pen j becomes infected at time t is given by
p j,t = 1− exp
(
−
(
βw I j,t
N j,t
+ βb I j−1,t
N j−1,t +Nj,t
( )
+ βb I j+1,t
N j+1,t +Nj,t
( ) )),
where Ij,t, Ij−1,t and Ij+1,t are the number of infectious
animals in pens j, j – 1 and j+ 1 at time t, respectively,
and Nj,t, Nj−1,t and Nj+1,t are the total number of pigs
in these pens. From these simulations, we estimated
the proportion of outbreaks that fail or result in lim-
ited numbers of infected animals, the number of
newly infected pigs and the total number of infectious
pigs per day. Simulations were implemented with R
statistical software [35].
RESULTS
Transmission parameters for ASFV
Assuming blood as a biological marker for infectious-
ness, the increase in the latent period duration from
model 1 to model 3 (i.e. from L = 3 to L= 5 days)
resulted in an increase in βw and βb values (Table 4).
The highest βw and βb estimates were obtained for
model 3 with 0·9 (95% CI 0·4–1·3) and 0·4 (95% CI
0·2–0·7) newly infected pigs per day within and be-
tween pens, respectively. The lowest AIC was
obtained for model 2, followed by model 3, and
model 1 had the highest AIC. A similar pattern was
observed for the R0w and R0b estimates rather than
for the βw and βb estimates. In addition, the increase
in the infectious period duration (i.e. from T = 3–6
to T = 3–14 days) also resulted in an increase in R0w
Fig. 1. Schematic representation of the SEIR model used for estimating the experimental pig-to-pig transmission
parameters for African swine fever virus. Considering two adjacent pens A and B at time t, pigs leave the susceptible
compartment (St) and become infected (EA,t or EB,t) with probability pi,t. They leave the infected compartment and
become infectious (IA,t or IB,t) after L days. Finally, they leave the infectious compartment and die (Rt) after T days.
Table 4. Maximum likelihood estimates (95% confidence intervals) for experimental pig-to-pig transmission
parameters for Georgia 2007/1 African swine fever virus strain
Parameter Model 1 (L= 3 days) Model 2 (L= 4 days) Model 3 (L= 5 days)
βw (per day) 0·5 (0·3–0·7) 0·6 (0·3–1·0) 0·9 (0·4–1·3)
βb (per day) 0·3 (0·1–0·4) 0·3 (0·1–0·5) 0·4 (0·2–0·7)
Minimum infectious period duration, T = 3–6 days
R0w 2·2 (1·1–3·7) 2·8 (1·3–4·8) 3·9 (1·9–6·4)
R0b 1·2 (0·4–2·1) 1·4 (0·6–2·4) 1·9 (0·9–3·2)
HIT (%) 55 (9–73) 64 (23–79) 74 (47–84)
Maximum infectious period duration, T= 3–14 days
R0w 4·0 (1·2–8·5) 5·3 (1·7–10·3) 7·2 (2·1–14·2)
R0b 2·0 (0·6–4·3) 2·5 (0·8–5·2) 3·5 (1·2–7·0)
HIT (%) 75 (17–88) 81 (41–90) 86 (55–93)
AIC 77·3 68·3 71·5
HIT, Herd immunity threshold; AIC, Akaike’s Information Criterion.
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and R0b values (Table 4). The highest R0w and R0b
estimates were generated by model 3 showing that in-
fectious pigs would cause up to 7·2 (95% CI 2·1–14·2)
and 3·5 (95% CI 1·2–7·0) new infected cases within
and between pens, respectively. R0b estimates were
generally lower than R0w estimates, but not signifi-
cantly greater than the threshold value of 1 in all mod-
els (except for model 3 with the maximum infectious
period) considering the lower bound of the 95% CI.
Similarly, the HITs reflected the R0 values, with the
highest levels of vaccination required for model 3, i.
e. from 74% (95% CI 47–84) to 86% (95% CI 55–93)
depending on the infectious period duration.
Simulation of ASFV outbreaks
The decrease in the latent period from model 3 to
model 1 (i.e. from L= 5 to L = 3 days) resulted in an
increase in the probability that an outbreak does not
occur after ASFV is introduced into the farm and in
the probability that this outbreak does not lead to
the infection of all animals (Table 5). This effect was
particularly marked for a shorter infectious period,
i.e. T = 3–6 days. Decreasing the infectious period in
all models from T = 3–14 days to T= 3–6 days
resulted in an increase in the probability that the out-
break goes extinct (i.e. non-occurrence and incomplete
population infection). This effect was particularly
strong for a shorter latent period of L = 3 days
(model 1). As a result, model 3 produced a 7% prob-
ability of outbreak failure and 10–17% probability of
not all pigs on the farm becoming infected.
Varying durations of latent and infectious periods
resulted in similar epidemic curves (Fig. 2). For ex-
ample, at the peak of the epidemic curve in all models,
the number of newly infected pigs per day remained
around 10 (95% CI 0–25) [Fig. 2(a1–c2)].
The increase in the latent period duration did not
seem to modify the prevalence curve although it
slightly increased the outbreak duration in all models,
regardless of the infectious period duration (Fig. 2).
For example, in model 3, the last infectious pigs
were reported around 70 (95% CI 0–90) days com-
pared to model 1 at around 60 (95% CI 0–80) days
[Fig. 2(c1 vs. a1)]. The increase in the infectious period
duration generally resulted in significantly higher
numbers of infectious pigs per day and longer out-
break duration. For example, in model 2, more than
100 (95% CI 0–200) infectious pigs were observed at
the peak of the prevalence curve and these animals
were reported until 80 (95% CI 0–100) days when
using the infectious period of 3–14 days (Fig. 2b2).
When decreasing the infectious period to 3–6 days, ap-
proximately 50 (95% CI 0–100) infectious pigs
remained at the peak of the prevalence curve and no
infectious pigs were reported after 65 (95% CI 0–85)
days (Fig. 2b1).
DISCUSSION
This study provides quantitative estimates for the dy-
namics of pig-to-pig transmission for ASFV. Model 2,
assuming a 4-day latent period and using presence of
live virus in blood as a marker of infectiousness, had
the smallest AIC value and was thus the model with
the best fit to the data from the transmission experi-
ments. For this model, the estimate for the transmis-
sion rate parameter (β) within a pen was 0·6 (95%
CI 0·3–1·0) per day, while between pens it was 0·3
(95% CI 0·1–0·5) per day. The lower AIC for model
Table 5. Description of outbreaks simulated in a pig unit for Georgia 2007/1 ASFV strain
Parameter Model 1 (L= 3 days) Model 2 (L= 4 days) Model 3 (L= 5days)
Minimum infectious period duration, T= 3–6 days
Probability that outbreak does not occur after
ASFV introduction to the farm
0·22 0·17 0·07
Probability that outbreak does not lead to
infection of all population after ASFV
introduction to the farm
0·65 0·45 0·17
Maximum infectious period duration, T= 3–14 days
Probability that outbreak does not occur after
introduction of ASFV to the farm
0·16 0·10 0·07
Probability that outbreak does not lead to
infection of all population after ASFV
introduction to the farm
0·27 0·18 0·10
ASFV, African swine fever virus.
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2 compared to models 1 and 3 suggests that 4 days
might be a more appropriate latent period than 3–5
days. In the transmission experiments, this
corresponds to the time when ASFV genome was
first recovered in oro-nasal excretions from contact
animals before they showed viraemia [26]. This
Fig. 2. Median (dots) and 95% confidence intervals (shaded area) of the number of newly infected pigs (red) and of the
total number of infectious pigs (blue) per day during simulated outbreaks within a farm unit with Georgia ASFV 2007/1
strain based on three different models. (a1, a2) Model 1 assumed a 3-day latent period. (b1, b2) Model 2 assumed a 4-day
latent period. (c1, c2) Model 3 assumed a 5-day latent period. Infectious period duration (days) was represented as a
normal distribution (mean ± standard deviation) of either 4·5 ± 0·75 days (a1, b1, c1) or 8·5 ± 2·75 days (a2, b2, c2).
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means that the use of qPCR assay in oro-nasal sam-
ples from contact animals appears to be an effective
tool for early detection of infection, as has previously
been suggested for CSFV [25]. In addition, swabs are
easier and cheaper to collect as well as requiring a less
stressful sample collection procedure for the pigs than
taking blood samples. However, it cannot be excluded
that ASFV could be excreted through other routes or
that contact pigs could be infectious after different
days post-exposure that were not tested here. For ex-
ample, in this study viraemia was considered closely
related to efficiency of ASFV transmission, although
the detection of live CSFV in oropharyngeal samples
was reported to be a better indicator for infectiousness
than blood samples [25]. This was not assessed in the
present study due to the limited numbers of positive
virus titration assay in oral samples.
Results demonstrate that, assuming a mean infec-
tious period of 4·5 days, infectious pigs would infect
on average 2·8 (95% CI 1·3–4·8) animals within their
pen and 1·4 (95% CI 0·6–2·4) animals between pens.
In the transmission studies, acute disease and fatal out-
comes were observed for all individual infected pigs
but the dynamics of the transmission process were rela-
tively slow (Table 2), resulting in a prolonged epidemic
at the herd level. In addition, specific or apparent clin-
ical signs have been reported infrequently [26–28].
According to field observations, no particular clinical
signs of illness or values of pig mortality were observed
by animal keepers in most of the ASF cases [1].
Outcomes also showed that ASF outbreaks could go
extinct within a pig unit, with 10–17% probability of
outbreak failure and 18–45% probability of small-scale
transmission. This therefore emphasizes the potential
factors that make farmers or animal workers more
likely to under-report suspicious ASF cases.
Estimates for the between-pen basic reproduction
number (R0b) indicate that the disease spread among
pigs is less efficient between than within pens. This
suggests that adjustments to the design of the pen lay-
out within a pig unit, such as better physically isolat-
ing neighbouring pens from each other, are likely to
reduce pig-to-pig ASFV transmission. This probably
also means that ASFV transmission occurs even
more slowly between different pig houses or farms
than was estimated among pigs in these transmission
experiments. Although better pen separation should
be feasible in pig farms [3], this will be more challen-
ging in traditional free-ranging or backyard farms that
are commonly found in Eastern Europe and where
animals are not confined within a fenced area [1].
These findings also imply that animals moved from
one pen to another should be assessed for health status
under conditions of strict quarantine considering the
latent period observed in animals. However, this will
also be unrealistic in areas where lack of interest
from stakeholders in eradicating the disease or poor
compliance to biosecurity regulations are common
[1]. In addition, design considerations for pig pens
are unlikely to have practical impacts at the regional
or national level for disease control strategies.
Our estimates for R0 are quite different from those
reported in previous studies on ASFV transmission:
R0 for the moderately virulent Malta strain was esti-
mated to be 18·0 (95% CI 6·9–46·9) [37], while that
for the highly virulent Russia strain was 9·8 (95% CI
3·9–15·6) [19]. This may reflect differences in virus
strain, infection and infectiousness markers, patho-
genesis, diagnostic tools, experimental conditions
and estimation methods. Moreover, assumptions
about when pigs became infected and how long they
remained infectious influenced our estimates for the
pig-to-pig transmission parameters and, hence, any
conclusions about ASFV transmission within a farm
(i.e. outbreak size and duration) and control (i.e. crit-
ical level of vaccination coverage). A study that fo-
cused on CSFV transmission found, for example, a
significant difference between weaner and slaughter
pigs, explained by potential various types of contact
or susceptibility to the infection [34]. Although the
clinical course of ASFV does not seem to be age de-
pendent [28], infection transmission dynamics may
also be influenced by host characteristics (e.g. sex or
breed). Although the effect of housing systems on
ASFV transmission remains unclear, the density and
the contact structures that vary between backyard
and different types of commercial pig farms are also
likely to result in different pig-to-pig transmission
parameters. This demonstrates the importance of con-
sidering the assumptions behind the model when the
aim is to use the estimated values to draw inferences
about the actual transmission dynamics [38, 39]. In
the current study, intramuscularly inoculated pigs
were used as virus sources for exposure of susceptible
pigs. Although this route of inoculation has been
shown to efficiently induce infection [40], it is not
the natural route of transmission to susceptible pigs.
This is likely to impact on our R0 estimates, particu-
larly due to significant differences in the course of
pathogenesis reported between intramuscularly inocu-
lated pigs and pigs infected by contact [26]. As a re-
sult, secondary contact infection should be used in
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future experiments for generating R0 estimates that are
a better representation of field conditions [41].
Therefore, more data from the field or from transmis-
sion experiments in relation to ASFV infection dy-
namics in domestic pigs are needed to be able to
better understand the behaviour of the virus, especial-
ly in the context of different pig production systems.
This study provides insight into quantitative
pig-to-pig transmission parameters for the currently
circulating ASFV strain in Eastern European coun-
tries. The experimental conditions that were used are
likely to match those observed in commercial weaner
pig units with good sanitary measures and with the
possibility of direct and indirect contact between
pigs that are housed within several adjacent pens.
Findings show a low to moderate transmissibility of
ASFV between pigs and that the transmission is
influenced by the contact structure between these ani-
mals. These estimated transmission parameters are
essential to inform future mathematical models devel-
oped with the aim of predicting between-farm ASFV
spread in Eastern European countries and beyond,
which will also help policy-makers to optimize inter-
ventions that are available to impede the ASFV
spread.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are grateful to the African Swine Fever Group, the
Mathematical Biology Group and the Transmission
Biology Group of The Pirbright Institute for assist-
ance.
The research leading to these results has received
funding from the European Union’s Seventh Frame-
work Programme (FP7/2007–2013) under grant agree-
ment no. 311 931 (ASFORCE). This work supported
by the Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Re-
search Council (BBSRC), the Department for Envir-
onment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and the
National Center for Foreign Animal and Zoonotic
Disease Defense (FAZD).
DECLARATION OF INTEREST
None.
REFERENCES
1. EFSA Panel. Scientific opinion on African swine fever.
EFSA Journal 2014; 12: 3628.
2. OIE. WAHID database (http://www.oie.int/wahis_2/
public/wahid.php/Diseaseinformation/Diseaseoutbreak
maps?disease_type_hidden=&disease_id_hidden=&sele
cted_disease_name_hidden=&disease_type=0&disease_
id_terrestrial=12&disease_id_aquatic=-999&s).
3. Madec F, et al. Good practices for biosecurity in the pig
sector: issues and options in developing and transition
countries. Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations, 2010.
4. de Carvalho Ferreira HC, et al. African swine fever virus
excretion patterns in persistently infected animals: a
quantitative approach. Veterinary Microbiology 2012;
160: 327–340.
5. Ekue NF, Wilkinson PJ, Wardley RC. Infection of pigs
with the Cameroon isolate (Cam/82) of African swine
fever virus. Journal of Comparative Pathology 1989;
100: 145–154.
6. Blome S, et al. High virulence of African swine fever
virus Caucasus isolate in European wild boars of all
ages. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2012; 18: 708.
7. Greig A, Plowright W. The excretion of two virulent
strains of African swine fever virus by domestic pigs.
Journal of Hygiene (London) 1970; 68: 673–682.
8. Howey EB, et al. Pathogenesis of highly virulent African
swine fever virus in domestic pigs exposed via intraoro-
pharyngeal, intranasopharyngeal, and intramuscular
inoculation, and by direct contact with infected pigs.
Virus Research 2013; 178: 328–339.
9. McVicar JW. Quantitative aspects of the transmission
of African swine fever. American Journal of Veterinary
Research 1984; 45: 1535–1541.
10. Eblé P, et al. Quantification of within- and between-pen
transmission of foot-and-mouth disease virus in pigs.
Veterinary Research 2006; 37: 647–654.
11. Costard S, et al. African swine fever: How can global
spread be prevented? Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences
2009; 364: 2683–2696.
12. Mur L, et al. Quantitative risk assessment for the intro-
duction of African swine fever virus into the European
Union by legal import of live pigs. Transboundary and
Emerging Diseases 2012; 59: 134–144.
13. Mur L, Martinez-Lopez B, Sanchez-Vizcaino J. Risk of
African swine fever introduction into the European
Union through transport-associated routes: returning
trucks and waste from international ships and planes.
BMC Veterinary Research 2012; 8: 149.
14. Wilkinson PJ, Donaldson AI. Transmission studies with
African swine fever virus. The early distribution of virus
in pigs infected by airborne virus. Journal of
Comparative Pathology 1977; 87: 497–501.
15. Anderson RM, May RM. Population biology of infec-
tious diseases: Part I. Nature 1979; 280: 361.
16. Ferguson N, et al. Estimation of the basic reproduction
number of BSE: the intensity of transmission in British
cattle. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London,
Series B: Biological Sciences 1999; 266: 23–32.
17. Ferguson NM, Donnelly CA, Anderson RM.
Transmission intensity and impact of control policies
Transmission of African swine fever 33
on the foot and mouth epidemic in Great Britain.
Nature 2001; 413: 542–548.
18. Wonham MJ, de-Camino-Beck T, Lewis MA. An epi-
demiological model for West Nile virus: invasion ana-
lysis and control applications. Proceedings of the
Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological Sciences
2004; 271: 501–507.
19. Gulenkin VM, et al. Cartographical analysis of African
swine fever outbreaks in the territory of the Russian
Federation and computer modeling of the basic repro-
duction ratio. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 2011;
102: 167–174.
20. Diekmann O, Heesterbeek JAP. Mathematical
Epidemiology of Infectious Diseases: Model Building,
Analysis and Interpretation. Chichester: Wiley, 2000.
21. Vynnycky E, White R. An Introduction to Infectious
Disease Modelling: Oxford: OUP, 2010.
22. Wearing HJ, Rohani P, Keeling MJ. Appropriate mod-
els for the management of infectious diseases. PLoS
Medicine 2005; 2: e174.
23. Keeling MJ, Rohani P. Modeling Infectious Diseases in
Humans and Animals. USA: Princeton University
Press, 2008.
24. Gogin A, et al. African swine fever in the North
Caucasus region and the Russian Federation in years
2007–2012. Virus Research 2013; 173: 198–203.
25. de Carvalho Ferreira H, et al. Suitability of faeces and
tissue samples as a basis for non-invasive sampling for
African swine fever in wild boar. Veterinary
Microbiology 2014; 172: 449–454.
26. Guinat C, et al. Dynamics of African swine fever virus
shedding and excretion in domestic pigs infected by
intramuscular inoculation and contact transmission.
Veterinary Research 2014; 45: 93.
27. Blome S, Gabriel C, Beer M. Pathogenesis of African
swine fever in domestic pigs and European wild boar.
Virus Research 2013; 173: 122–130.
28. Blome S, et al. High virulence of African swine fever
virus caucasus isolate in European wild boars of all
ages. Emerging Infectious Diseases 2012; 18: 708.
29. Gabriel C, et al. Characterization of African swine fever
virus Caucasus isolate in European wild boars.
Emerging Infectious Diseases 2011; 17: 2342–2345.
30. Keeling M, Grenfell B. Disease extinction and commu-
nity size: modeling the persistence of measles. Science
1997; 275: 65–67.
31. Bouma A, De Jong M, Kimman T. Transmission of
pseudorabies virus within pig populations is independ-
ent of the size of the population. Preventive Veterinary
Medicine 1995; 23: 163–172.
32. McCallum H, Barlow N, Hone J. How should pathogen
transmission be modelled? Trends in Ecology &
Evolution 2001; 16: 295–300.
33. Petrov A, et al. Alternative sampling strategies for
passive classical and African swine fever surveillance
in wild boar. Veterinary Microbiology 2014; 173:
360–365.
34. Klinkenberg D, et al.Within- and between-pen transmis-
sion of classical swine fever virus: a new method to
estimate the basic reproduction ratio from transmission
experiments. Epidemiology & Infection 2002; 128:
293–299.
35. Myung IJ. Tutorial on maximum likelihood esti-
mation. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 2003; 47:
90–100.
36. Burnham KP, Anderson DR. Model Selection and
Multimodel Inference: a Practical Information-Theoretic
Approach. Fort Collins, USA: Springer, 2002.
37. Sanchez-Vizcaino J, et al. An update on the epidemi-
ology and pathology of African swine fever. Journal of
Comparative Pathology 2015; 152: 9–21.
38. Lloyd-Smith JO, et al. Superspreading and the effect of
individual variation on disease emergence. Nature 2005;
438: 355–359.
39. Woolhouse M. How to make predictions about future
infectious disease risks. Philosophical Transactions of
the Royal Society of London, Series B: Biological
Sciences 2011; 366: 2045–2054.
40. Howey EB, et al. Pathogenesis of highly virulent African
swine fever virus in domestic pigs exposed via intraoro-
pharyngeal, intranasopharyngeal, and intramuscular in-
oculation, and by direct contact with infected pigs. Virus
Research 2013; 178: 328–339.
41. Bouwknegt M, et al. Estimation of hepatitis E virus
transmission among pigs due to contact-exposure.
Veterinary Research 2008; 39: 1.
34 C. Guinat and others
